Power on Paper, Not in the Market
The figures are thought-provoking. The 12 main members of the Forum — including Algeria, Bolivia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Russia, Trinidad and Tobago, the UAE and Venezuela — hold about 70 percent of the world's proven gas reserves, 38 percent of commercial production, 42 percent of gas exports and about 47 percent of LNG exports. But power on paper is not the same as power in the market. OPEC derives its power from a specific tool: the production quota. Its members can, with one collective decision, remove millions of barrels from the market or add them to it and change the price. The Gas Exporting Countries Forum effectively has no such tool and, as Iran's Ministry of Petroleum has stated, shows no inclination to have one either. Its nature is "consultative, analytical and cooperation-oriented". The reason for this is structural. A large part of gas is sold through long-term contracts and dedicated pipelines, not in a single market with a single price. Russian gas to Europe and China, Qatari gas to Asia and Algerian gas to Southern Europe are sold in three separate markets with completely different logics. So the absence of a price lever is not a temporary gap; it is the result of the nature of the commodity itself. Even if the members wanted, joint regulation of supply is effectively impossible. If the Gas Exporting Countries Forum has no price lever, then what does it have? Three indirect (soft) tools: statistical credibility, a table for dialogue, and knowledge production. These differ from a "direct tool" such as OPEC's production quota, because a quota can directly change supply and price, whereas these three tools can only build credibility and influence.
The GECF's Soft Tools
First, statistical weight. No serious conversation about energy security can ignore a 70-percent share of world reserves. Second, a negotiating table — a place where Iran and Russia, Qatar and Nigeria, or the UAE and Venezuela sit in one room. For sanctioned countries this official channel is valuable, as Bourd's meeting with Russia's energy minister on the sidelines of this very summit exemplifies. Third, joint knowledge production: supply and demand forecasts, shared databases and technical studies. If producers do not have an independent narrative of the market's future, as against the agencies of consumer countries, others will write the narrative. Tehran proposes exactly this: shared information databases, long-term forecasts and cooperation among research centers, while preserving the Forum's multilateral, consensus-based nature.
Two Messages in One Trip
The Iranian delegation goes to Moscow with two agendas. On the political axis, according to Seyed Ali Mohammad Mousavi, the deputy for international affairs at the Ministry of Petroleum, explaining "America's military aggressions" and condemning them is the priority. The martyrdom of the Leader of the Revolution, military commanders and civilian citizens, and the Minab and Lamerd incidents, will also be raised within the framework of official positions. This part addresses a political audience more than the gas market, and it remains to be seen what share of it will remain in a statement written by consensus of the members. The Ministry of Petroleum itself says the final content of the statement depends on the agreement of all member countries, among whom the UAE, one of Washington's closest allies, is present. On the energy axis, Iran's message has three sides: confronting the "politicization of the energy trade" and unilateral restrictions, the necessity of investment security in the gas value chain, and defending a "realistic and fair" energy transition. Tehran argues that gas will maintain its role in the coming decades as well, because it pollutes less than coal and, while acting as a complement to solar and wind energies, the demand of developing countries is also growing. Therefore, if investment in the exploration and development of gas fields decreases or is delayed, a few years later supply will fall behind demand, prices will fluctuate and the market will become more fragile. In the view of Iranian officials, this situation harms both sides, seller and buyer alike. This argument must be read with two lenses. The gas industry really is capital-intensive, and instability and sanctions raise the cost of financing. But for Iran, this discussion also carries a message about itself: a country with one of the world's largest gas reserves that has been unable to benefit from it in LNG exports and attracting foreign investment. When Tehran speaks of "non-discriminatory access to technology and financial resources", its real concern is the policies that have restricted access to modern technologies.
Russia; Host, Partner and Rival
The Moscow trip is an opportunity to meet Russia's energy minister and negotiate over gas swaps. Bourd calls the two countries' energy relations "appropriate" and says Russian companies hold contracts for developing some of Iran's oil and gas fields. He emphasizes the complementarity of exports via pipelines and LNG, and the capacity for cooperation in field development and technology transfer. He also recalls that implementing joint projects requires examining their economic justification, contractual framework and financing. In simple terms, understanding is still far from a contract. There is also a subtlety that is less often stated: Iran and Russia are the two largest holders of the world's gas reserves and can be rivals in target markets. Their cooperation, rather than being a relationship between two complementary partners, may be a transaction between two sanctioned players, both of whom need alternative routes and buyers.
Statements with the Lowest Common Denominator
All three of the Forum's assets are soft, and converting them into real influence depends on the members' will. Statistical weight has an effect when the members speak with one voice, but their interests are contradictory: Qatar and the UAE on one side, Russia, Iran and Venezuela on the other. Consensus statements are usually written at the lowest common denominator. The negotiating table is useful when it leads to a contract, and Iranian officials themselves acknowledge that the distance from understanding to an executive project is full of economic and financial conditions. Knowledge production is also effective when consumers pay attention to it. The summit's timing highlights this weakness further. The Hormuz disruption has made oil and liquefied gas expensive and has drawn buyers toward diversification and investment in the Western Hemisphere. Today's buyer asks: "Which cargo will definitely reach its destination?" A forum part of whose members are under sanctions or located in a war region has no clear answer to this question. The four challenges that Iranian officials enumerate show the same knot: establishing a balance between energy supply and energy-transition policies, securing capital for production and exports, trade, financial and technological restrictions, and the necessity of reducing methane emissions.
The Measure of Judgment
The Gas Exporting Countries Forum resembles a club rather than an influential institution. Such an institution can build collective credibility and facilitate dialogue, but it cannot manage the market. The real measure is not in the text of the statement; it is on the sidelines of the summit. If in Moscow we move from understanding to contract and these soft assets are converted into practical influence, the twenty-fifth anniversary will be a turning point. If the summit ends in a statement about the "necessity of investment" and "avoiding politicization", the answer to the main question will be clear: a forum that cannot convert understanding into contract has nothing but talk to sell. In that case, Moscow will once again have hosted a dialogue about gas, not a deal over it.
Source: Donya-e-Eqtesad
