Principlist Newspaper: To Exit the “Neither War nor Peace” Situation, One Must Only Resist

According to KhabarOnline, the Javan newspaper wrote: These remarks of the President are a true word which, if not properly understood, may go astray.

Dr. Pezeshkian's remarks about the necessity of the country exiting the neither-war-nor-peace situation pose a fundamental question before the country's foreign policy and domestic management: with an enemy who neither honors his agreements, nor stops escalating sanctions and military actions, nor hides that he seeks Iran's destruction, how can a lasting solution be reached?

The principle of exiting the erosive neither-war-nor-peace situation is a proposition worth pondering, but the main issue is not the necessity of ending this situation, but how to achieve it. Compromise in international relations can lead to the resolution of disputes when the parties adhere at least to a minimum of common rules, mutual commitments and the costs of breaching an agreement.

Iran's issue with America is not merely a dispute over a few specific topics; it is an identity conflict with a long history of hostility, sanctions, pressure and distrust, which has also shown itself in the experience of the nuclear negotiations.

America's withdrawal from the JCPOA, despite the commitments accepted and the continuation of the pressure policy, has made this question more serious: to what extent can relying again on negotiation, without a change in the other side's calculations, secure Iran's national interests? Can one think of an honorable compromise with an enemy who, from the first day of Dr. Pezeshkian's government, while escalating economic pressures, has followed the path of hostile actions and even resorted to military action in the middle of diplomatic processes? Negotiation, of course, is a tool of foreign policy, not a goal independent of security, independence and national interests, and certainly its value also depends on the result it brings for the country in practice.

There is no doubt that the continuation of the neither-war-nor-peace situation can lead to the erosion of the country's economic, social and managerial capacities. Therefore, ending the erosive situation is a strategic necessity. But can any agreement end this situation? If compromise means one-sided retreat in the face of pressure, without the other side abandoning threat, sanctions and interference, the result will be not the end of the crisis but its transfer to another stage. Therefore, the fundamental question is not whether to negotiate or not, but how negotiation can be transformed from a position based on one-sided pressure into a process relying on mutual interests and practical guarantees.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has had numerous experiences of negotiation and agreement in past decades. These experiences show that diplomacy, even in the most difficult conditions, can be a tool for reducing tension and securing part of the country's interests, but at the same time, no agreement, merely by being signed, guarantees the future behavior of the other side.

Any new diplomatic path must be based on a realistic assessment of the other side's behavior, the possibility of verifying commitments, having implementation guarantees and foreseeing the costs of breaching the agreement. In such a framework, diplomacy and national power stand not against each other but in continuation of each other. Yes, one must exit the neither-war-nor-peace situation and not allow the enemy to reach his goals through a war of attrition — but how? With an enemy who twice shelled the negotiating table, does not honor his signature and commitment, and unlike his predecessors has thrown away his velvet glove and drawn his sword against Iran, how can one enter through negotiation and compromise? Against such an enemy, is there any option left other than becoming strong and resisting?

Over the past eight months, the people and the armed forces have shown that, with authority, resistance and steadfastness, they have undone all the enemy's schemes; of course, the honorable government has also used all its power, with financial and logistical support and backing, to thwart the enemy in the war of resilience — but sometimes it is observed that some executive bodies have not yet taken on a war footing and have fallen behind the government's locomotive.

If the enemy, in addition to military pressure and sanctions, counts on eroding the country's economic capacity and society's psychological resilience, confronting this strategy is not possible merely with political positions and occasional actions. Executive bodies must act according to the country's conditions — from the stable supply of essential goods and controlling the effects of economic pressure to removing production obstacles, reducing administrative inefficiency and creating confidence in society. The more efficiently the government manages affairs, the higher the costs of the enemy's attrition strategy become, and the social capital needed to pass through the crisis is strengthened.

Therefore, the answer to the question of whether any option other than becoming strong and resisting remains against such an enemy depends on our definition of resistance. If we define resistance as preventing the enemy from imposing his will and increasing the country's power to defend national interests, diplomacy can also be part of this same strategy. Compromise can approach the end of hostility when the enemy cannot exploit negotiation, sanctions and a war of attrition to impose his demands. Exiting neither war nor peace, without changing the other side's calculations, is difficult, and changing these calculations, more than anything, requires national power, internal cohesion and diplomacy based on reality.

Iran's issue today is not a simple choice between war and negotiation. The issue is the simultaneous management of two fields: the field of confronting external pressure and the field of efficiently running the country. In the first field, defensive deterrence, national cohesion and diplomacy based on practical guarantees are necessary. In the second field, the government must, with a clear plan for livelihood, production, trade, employment and reforming inefficient procedures, not allow external pressure to lead to the erosion of internal capacity. If the enemy seeks a war of attrition, one must not allow managerial weakness, economic uncertainty and dissatisfaction arising from solvable problems to become factors intensifying this erosion.